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ABSTRACT
The disuse hypothesis of cognitive aging attributes decrements in fluid intelligence
in older adults to reduced cognitively stimulating activity. This study experimentally
tested the hypothesis that a period of increased mentally stimulating activities thus
would enhance older adults’ fluid intelligence performance. Participants (N=44,
mean age 67.82) were administered pre- and post-test measures, including the fluid
intelligence measure, Cattell’s Culture Fair (CCF) test. Experimental participants
engaged in diverse, novel, mentally stimulating activities for 10–12 weeks and were
compared to a control condition. Results supported the hypothesis; the experimental
group showed greater pre- to post-CCF gain than did controls (effect size d=.56),
with a similar gain on a spatial-perceptual task (WAIS-R Blocks). Even brief periods
of increased cognitive stimulation can improve older adults’ problem solving and
flexible thinking.
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This research was conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree
in Psychology at the University of Reading, UK, awarded to Lesley J. Tranter in July, 2006.
We would like to thank Dr Judi Ellis for timely and always thoughtful mentoring, Professor
Philip Smith for expert statistical advice, and Professor David Warburton for his continued
interest and enthusiasm and his astute bibliographical suggestions. Research supported by the
Office of Sponsored Research, University of Reading.
Address correspondence to: Wilma Koutstaal, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota,
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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental issue for the study of cognition and aging is whether “fluid
intelligence” – our ability to creatively and flexibly grapple with the world
in ways that do not explicitly rely on prior learning or knowledge – can be
maintained into late adulthood. It is well documented that our general
knowledge, or semantic memory, tenaciously holds its own or even
improves with increasing age, possibly even until the sixth, seventh, or
later decades (e.g., Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999). This pres-
ervation of “crystallized intelligence” contrasts markedly with documented
age-associated declines in fluid intelligence (Baltes, 1987; Baltes & Lin-
denberger, 1997; Baltes et al., 1999; Horn & Cattell, 1967; Schaie, 1994;
Schaie & Hertzog, 1983; Schaie & Willis, 1993). Fluid intelligence, or that
part of intelligence that involves active problem solving in tasks for which
solutions cannot simply be derived from formal training or prior knowl-
edge (Horn & Cattell, 1967; Stuart-Hamilton, 1996), often shows mono-
tonic and approximately linear declines with age. These decreases are
particularly evident after age 60, with some decrements observed even ear-
lier, and additional, more accelerated, declines in very old age (Baltes et
al., 1999; Schaie & Hertzog, 1983). Yet it is not clear that such declines in
fluid intelligence are, in fact, inevitable.
Several lines of evidence (reviewed below) converge in pointing to the
possibility that older adults may, under appropriate conditions, show much
more flexible and adaptive thinking than might be expected. These studies
suggest that environmental conditions that invite the use of fluid intelligence
may be surprisingly important in maintaining cognitive performance. How-
ever, these sources of evidence are either indirect (e.g., longitudinal correla-
tional studies showing comparatively preserved intellectual functioning in
older adults who continue to engage in cognitively complex work and leisure
activities), or involve forms of test-specific training rather than manipula-
tions of involvement in more diverse, and less closely test-related, everyday
cognitive and creative activities. There are no direct experimental demon-
strations in healthy older adults of improvements in fluid intelligence arising
from increased environmental cognitive stimulation. The aim of the research
reported here was to experimentally test whether introducing older adults to
a period of novel, mentally stimulating activities would counteract decline
arising from the relative “disuse” of fluid intelligence.
Specifically, our experiments tested the “disuse” theory of cognitive aging
with regard to fluid intelligence. According to this theory (e.g., Christensen
et al., 1996; Orrell & Sahakian, 1995; Paggi & Hayslip, 1999; Schooler,
Mulatu, & Oates, 1999; also cf. Flynn, 2003), the lack of use (or disuse) of
problem-solving skills causes a reciprocal reduction of ability in this area,









AGE AND FLEXIBLE THINKING 3
be attributed to the diminished use of their problem-solving capacities.
Consistent with the disuse theory, a wide range of evidence from both ani-
mal and human studies demonstrates that there is considerable neuronal –
and cognitive-behavioural – plasticity in response to prolonged changes in
experiential input or perceptual-sensory stimuli.
Environmental Enrichment Paradigms and Evidence of Neural 
Plasticity
Direct evidence for experiential-dependent changes in higher cognitive
functioning comes from environmental enrichment paradigms used in ani-
mal studies (for a comprehensive review, see Van Praag, Kempermann, &
Gage, 2000). Studies have shown that in several mammals, although prima-
rily in rats, an increase of hippocampal depth of around 15% magnitude
(which was attributed to an increase in granule cell numbers) was observed
in animals exposed to environments that contained stimulating objects such
as toys and ropes (Kempermann, Kuhn & Gage, 1997). Rats exposed to such
“enriched environments” also have been shown to have superior problem-
solving skills in complex tasks (maze solving), and show an advantage in
various tasks requiring response flexibility, such as learning a reversal of a
previously learned visual discrimination (e.g., Krech, Rosenzweig, &
Bennett, 1962). It is of particular interest to the current research paradigm to
note that the beneficial effects of enrichment on problem-solving or
response-flexibility are not restricted to animals at an early stage of life-span
development, but also have been demonstrated in older animals (e.g., Doty,
1972; Diamond, Johnson, Protti, Ott, & Kajisa, 1985; Warren et al., 1982;
also see Rosenzweig, 2003). Sirevaag and Greenough (1987; Turner &
Greenough, 1985) conducted a comprehensive series of studies to analyze a
wide range of possible cortical synaptic, cellular, and vascular changes in
rats raised in enriched compared with control environments. Using light- and
electron-microscope techniques, these researchers demonstrated that prefer-
ential enrichment experiences were associated with several significant and
interrelated brain changes. Animals from enriched environments showed a
greater number of synapses per neuron (more than 20% increase), enhanced
dendrite length (approximately 10% increase), greater vascular volume
(approximately 50% increase), and more astrocyte processes and higher
mitrochondrial volume – indicating enhanced neuronal support and greater
metabolic activity.
Other researchers studying human sensory-motor representations using
neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging
have demonstrated that there is increased cortical representation associated
with special motor skills, for instance, an increased cortical representation of
the reading finger in blind subjects who read Braille, together with the
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for tactile information processing (Hamilton & Pascual-Leone, 1998).
Increased areas of activation in the primary motor cortex of sighted subjects
following several weeks of practice engaging in particular finger sequence
movements (Karni et al., 1995) also have been demonstrated. Other neu-
roimaging findings have pointed to additional plastic changes in the brain in
relation to experience. For example, a correlation between the size of the
posterior hippocampus and years of driving experience has been reported in
London taxi drivers (Maguire et al., 2000).
Perhaps more closely related to the current research are attempts by
Scheibel and colleagues (Jacobs & Scheibel, 1993; Jacobs, Scholl, &
Scheibel, 1993; see also Orrell & Sahakian, 1995; Shimamura, Berry,
Mangels, Rusting, & Jurica, 1995) to examine the relationship between
neuronal structure and education (also including ongoing involvement in
learning opportunities). For instance, these researchers found a positive
relation between dendrite size and education in a cortical language area
(Wernicke’s area). Post-mortem analyses also showed that deceased persons
with a college education had more dendritic branches than did those with
only a high school education. Intriguing and suggestive as these latter find-
ings are, however, they (unlike the enrichment studies with animals) are sus-
ceptible to differing causal interpretations: Were individuals who had more
dendritic branching more likely to complete further years of formal educa-
tion, or did more years of education lead to greater dendritic branching?
Test-relevant Training, Longitudinal Observational Studies, and Fluid 
Intelligence
An additional source of evidence pointing to the modifiability of fluid
intelligence performance in older adults involves test-relevant training. One
major study of this type is the Penn State Adult Development and Enrich-
ment Program (ADEPT; Baltes & Willis, 1982). This involved a series of
inter-related intervention studies varying in length from 1 month to 2 years,
with a focus on the range of individual modifiability (plasticity) in fluid
intelligence that can be affected by practice and training. Fluid intelligence
was chosen since it was the domain of intelligence most affected by aging.
Two types of training strategy were studied: the first involved self-guided
practice and the second trainer-guided instruction (geared to teaching prob-
lem-solving skills applicable to particular task demands). The assessment of
these interventions examined transfer of training effects to the broad spec-
trum of intelligence and the maintenance of any such gains.
One such study, that of Hofland, Willis and Baltes (1981), provided partic-
ipants (N=30, mean age 69 years) with the opportunity to have eight self-guided
practice sessions on intelligence tests. Continuous improvement was seen across
all eight sessions. These results were interpreted as showing that older people are
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performance significantly on tests of intelligence, providing “clear evidence for
plasticity or reserve capacity in old age” (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1988, p. 287).
Many other studies of guided training have been reported (e.g., Baltes,
Dittman-Kohli & Kliegl, 1986; Schaie & Willis, 1986; Willis, Blieszner &
Baltes, 1981). The pattern of results from these studies is consistent with that
found in a study by Baltes et al. (1986). In the latter study (N=204, mean age
72 years) using experimental and control groups, participants were tested
prior to cognitive training and post training at 1 week, 1 and 6 months.
Results showed significant improvement following cognitive training, with
near-transfer measures showing a gain of between one-half and two-thirds of
a standard deviation; however, the spectrum of transfer to non-practiced
tasks was limited. (Near transfer measures were defined as those that, for
example, shared the greatest similarity to the trained-on measures.) These
gains were maintained for 6 months. Notably, these outcomes were inter-
preted as demonstrating that older adults have the reserve capacity to benefit
from training even in the intellectual domain of fluid intelligence, which is
normally subject to age-related decline (Baltes & Lindenberger, 1988;
see Baltes et al., 1999 for a summary on cognitive intervention research).
Other recent research has shown beneficial effects of training aimed to
increase working memory capacity in younger adults (Olesen, Westerberg,
& Klingberg, 2004). These outcomes provide convergent support for the
notion that even relatively brief periods of training (5 weeks) may enhance
on-line cognitive processing capability that, in turn, is known to be posi-
tively correlated with performance on reasoning and problem-solving tasks
(e.g., Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003).
Nonetheless, despite the reported success of guided training interven-
tions, a notable limitation of many test-specific training studies is the lack of
successful transfer of performance gains to less closely related probes of
cognitive function (e.g., Ball, et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 2002; Baltes et al.,
1999). One recent noteworthy exception involved an intervention focused on
“recollection memory training” (Jennings, Webster, Kleykamp, & Hale,
2005). As demonstrated by Jacoby and others (e.g., Jennings & Jacoby,
1993, 1997, 2003; Koutstaal, 2003, 2006), conscious controlled memory
processing shows age-related decline; this problem can be seen in everyday
behaviour as older adults become increasingly likely to retell a story to the
same audience. Jennings and Jacoby (2003) theorized that this was due to an
automatic strengthening of the story memory trace, which would occur at the
first telling and the story would be repeated as a consequence of this along
with a failure of recollection for having already told the tale. Whereas the
strengthening effect would occur for everyone, those with intact memory
function would successfully avoid repetition through the recollection of
information that would alert them to the fact that the story had already been
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A task that similarly demands recollective processing is the so-called
“repetition-lag procedure.” In this procedure, a participant is asked to per-
form a word recognition task where a list of words that were read aloud
during an initial study-phase is mixed with new (non-studied) words in a yes–
no recognition task. There is, however, one important catch: Some of the new,
non-studied words are shown on two occasions during the test, and so will take
on some level of familiarity. Thus the second presentation could lead the par-
ticipant to wrongly conclude that a repeated new word was presented in the
original study list. To continue to make the correct response to “new” items
requires conscious recollection of specific event details from memory.
In an earlier study, Jennings and Jacoby (1997) compared a group of
younger and older adults on their ability to correctly differentiate original
study words from the new words; repeated new words were shown after a lag
(or delay) of either 0, 3, or 12 intervening items. It was found that the older
adults made significantly more errors at a three-item lag and that this error-rate
increased for a 12-item lag. In the training manipulation (in the 2005 paper)
older adults were given six training sessions over a 3-week period. The lag
period (between the first and second presentation of a new word) was gradu-
ally increased across the training sessions as the participant’s performance
improved; positive feedback was given for correct responses. Two control
groups were used; one to control for any practice effects on the recognition test
and the other (a no contact group) to control for any pre- to post-manipulation
re-test effects on the cognitive measures. Following the six training sessions
participants were able to perform at the same level as young adults in response
to an 18- or 19-item lag. Equally important, the recollection-training group
also showed a significant pre- to post-training gain on four different transfer
tasks, involving different types of cognitive operations and different stimuli: a
working memory (n-back) task, self-ordered pointing, source monitoring, and
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test. Each of these tasks places clear demands
on frontal function, thereby raising the possibility that recollection training
induced a more general increase in frontal lobe dependent functioning.
Several longitudinal observational studies also offer support for the
idea that greater participation in mentally stimulating activities produces
reciprocal benefits in levels of cognitive function. One such longitudinal
study (Schooler et al., 1999) showed that continued engagement in substan-
tively complex work significantly increased workers’ level of intellectual
functioning – including performance on a measure of intellectual flexibil-
ity; this was particularly so for older workers. Structural equation model-
ling from this and earlier research led to the conclusion that work
environments “offering challenge and opportunity for doing self-directed
substantively complex work increase intellectual flexibility” (Schooler et
al., 1999, p. 466). A subsequent study (Schooler & Mulatu, 2001) extended
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intellectual functioning for workers and non-workers. Yet, these latter
studies (see also Gribbin, Schaie, & Parham, 1980; Hultsch, Hertzog,
Small, & Dixon, 1999) are again susceptible to a direction of causality cri-
tique: do older adults with higher cognitive ability actively seek out cogni-
tive challenge and mental stimulation, or do they show higher or
maintained levels of cognitive functioning because they more often engage
in mentally stimulating activity?
Rationale and Hypothesis
The aim of the research we report here was to test, experimentally,
the hypothesis that novel, mentally stimulating activities produce a corre-
sponding benefit in cognitive function in older adults. In a two-phase
experiment, healthy older participants were randomly assigned to either
experimental or control conditions. (By randomly assigning participants to
either increased or no increase in mentally stimulating activity, we avoid
the direction of causality critique.) Participants in both the experimental
and control conditions were administered cognitive tests, including a mea-
sure of fluid intelligence and a spatial-perceptual task, at both the begin-
ning (pre) and end (post) of a 10–12-week period. After the pre-test
measures, the experimental participants were provided numerous individ-
ual and group opportunities and materials to engage in a wide range of
novel problem-solving and creative activities. Participants in the control
condition also came into the laboratory for the initial cognitive tests, and
for a few subsequent social group meetings, but did not receive novel cog-
nitively stimulating opportunities.
If the disuse hypothesis of cognitive aging is correct, participants in the
experimental group should show increased performance on the standardized
measure of fluid intelligence from pre- to post-test, and this increase should
be greater than that observed in the control group (that is, there should be a
group × time interaction). The activities were especially developed and cho-
sen to broadly encompass several areas of fluid intelligence, e.g., problem-
solving, spatial awareness and manipulation, creativity, etc. It, therefore,
was predicted that improvements would be observed on tasks that were not
themselves specifically practiced during the stimulation period. As we
report below, consistent with our hypothesis, in an exploratory, small scale,
initial phase of our research, we found supportive evidence that engaging in
novel, mentally stimulating tasks leads to an improvement in cognitive func-
tion – in particular, on a measure of fluid intelligence. This phase also pro-
vided suggestive evidence of greater gains in the experimental group on a
test of visual-spatial ability. These initial findings are reported here (as
Phase 1) together with an extension of the study (Phase 2) that was con-
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were randomly selected from a database of older adults who
had volunteered to be tested in various experiments in a university setting.
Participants in this database were recruited via several advertising cam-
paigns, including advertisements in local newspapers, radio interviews, and
posters placed in various public places (e.g., doctors’ offices, pharmacies,
health clubs, libraries, adult education centers, public swimming pools, and
fitness centers). All participants were in the age range of 60–75 years and
were living independently in the community. A total sample of 44 volunteers
was recruited across the two experimental phases: Phase 1 (P1), N  = 20;
Phase 2 (P2), N  = 24. The gender distribution across all phases was a three-
to-one female-to-male ratio.
All volunteers were tested on a standardized cognitive screening bat-
tery, including several cognitive and neuropsychological tests that are
detailed below. The battery also included several health exclusion screening
criteria; in particular, participants with a history of any major cardiac or vas-
cular surgery or pathology, who had received chemotherapy, or who had
experienced prolonged unconsciousness, were excluded. Administration of
the cognitive screening battery required approximately 90 min.
Cognitive and Neuropsychological Measures
The measure of fluid intelligence that was administered, and which
represents the main dependent variable of the experiment, was Cattell’s Cul-
ture Fair (CCF; Cattell & Cattell, 1960) test. Cattell’s Culture Fair test is
described by its authors as “measur[ing] individual intelligence in a manner
designed to reduce, as much as possible, the influence of verbal fluency, cul-
tural climate and educational level” (1960, p. 5, manual). The tests used are
non-verbal and require participants to attempt to perceive relationships
between shapes and figures. The test is composed of four subtests: series,
classification, matrices, and conditions. Scale 2 (Forms A and B) was used.
The four subtests require 2, 4, 3, and 2.5 min for completion, respectively. In
the first subtest, series, participants see 12 incomplete progressive series of
abstract shapes along with five alternatives for each; they are asked to select
the alternative that best completes the series. For the classifications subtest,
participants are shown 14 problems of five abstract shapes and figures and
are asked to select which, out of the five, does not match or belong with the
others. The odd one out was different in size, shape, orientation, or content.
In the third subtest, matrices, participants are presented with 12 incomplete
matrices containing either four or nine boxes containing shapes and figures;
one of the matrix boxes is empty and the participant is asked to select the
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complete the pattern correctly. In the fourth subtest, conditions, participants are
shown eight sets of abstract figures consisting of shapes, and lines with one or
two dots. The task of the participant is to work out the relationship between the
dots, in the example shown, and then find one (out of five) alternatives where the
same dot-to-shape relationship could be recreated. Thus if the dot shown, in the
example, was inside a circle and outside of a square then the participant would
try to select an alternative where it was also possible to locate a dot that would be
inside a circle and outside of a square. The score obtained is the sum of all cor-
rect answers across the four subtests; the total possible correct score is 40.
The CCF has been used in many studies of adult intelligence (e.g., Baltes,
Sowarka, & Kliegl, 1989; Colom & Garcia-Lopez, 2003; Klauer, Willmes, &
Phye, 2002; Rabbitt, 2000) and is invariably identified as a measure of fluid
intelligence. The CCF has also been used as a measure to examine between-gen-
erational gains in intelligence, and has been characterized as “one of the best
available measures of fluid intelligence” (Colom & Garcia-Lopez, 2003, p. 33).
A measure of mood, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale
(HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), was used as a screening tool to exclude
depressed individuals in the current research. This measure is a short self-
report scale designed to test for symptoms of anxiety and depression. The
upper end of the borderline score range is used (10/11 for each subscale) as a
screening criterion and this provides a low proportion of false positives of
participants that could be considered to be suffering from a mood disorder.
As described below, reference to this measure of mood, and possible
changes across the pre- to post-test period, also figured in the rationale for
the research that was provided to participants.
The National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson, 1982) provides a
measure of crystallized intelligence and partially reflects the level of formal
education completed by participants. This measure was used to enable
matching of the groups within the experiment on this aspect of cognitive
ability and as such was only administered at pre-test.
The Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, &
McHugh, 1975), a formalized mental status examination, was also adminis-
tered at pre-test only and represents a brief measure to facilitate the exclu-
sion of participants who likely are suffering from dementia. Folstein et al.
(1975) report that a score of below 20 was found, essentially, only in
patients with dementia. Woodruff-Pak (1997, p. 45) reports that a question
of mental impairment arises for scores equal to or below 23. A score equal to
or greater than 25 (out of a total of 30) was the specified cut-off criteria for
the current study (for other comments on interpretation of scores see Lezak,
1995, pp. 741–744).
The WAIS-R Blocks (Wechsler, 1981) was used as an additional pre-
and post-test measure. This test measures visual-spatial ability and is
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include as the nature of fluid intelligence tasks is such that they depend
heavily on visual-spatial manipulation of the stimuli to arrive at solutions to
test questions. As Horn and Hofer (1992) propose, visualization components
are inevitably involved in tests that are based on solving matrices and thus
should be given concurrently with measures of fluid reasoning ability. There
are several sources of evidence for the strong link between fluid intelligence
performance and visualization. One of these comes from Salthouse, Atkinson
and Berish (2003), where, in a study looking at the relationship between
fluid intelligence and frontal lobe function, they found that spatial visualiza-
tion tasks showed a very strong correlation (r  = .90) with fluid intelligence
measures. More generally, age-related decline on visual-spatial tasks is
widely reported (e.g., Horn & Cattell, 1967; Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, &
Hale, 2000; Schaie & Hertzog, 1983; Schwartzman, Gold, Andres,
Arbuckle, & Chaikelson, 1987).
In addition to these standardized measures, a questionnaire was
designed, for use in the current study, to establish the amount of current
involvement in mentally stimulating activities that the participants experi-
enced on a day-to-day basis: the Life Activities Questionnaire (LAQ). The
form and content of the questionnaire were based on a similar questionnaire
used in prior research by Wilson and colleagues (Wilson et al., 1999, 2002).
Wilson et al. (2002) used a baseline measure of seven common activities,
each of which was proposed to involve information processing as a central
component. These activities were: viewing television, listening to the radio,
reading newspapers, reading magazines, reading books, playing games such
as cards, checkers, doing crosswords or other puzzles, and going to muse-
ums. Of note, these were activities that did not make particular demands
relating to social interaction or physical activity. Wilson et al. used a fre-
quency of participation measure based on a five-point scale, where one point
was allocated if an activity was carried out once a year or less and five points
were allocated if the activity was carried out every day or about every day.
Intermediate points were allocated for activity frequencies between these
two end points. The final score was obtained by averaging responses to each
item, rather than weighting items on estimates of cognitive demand, as this
had been shown to be indistinguishable from a composite measure based on
both frequency and cognitive intensity (Wilson et al., 2002, p. 743).
The validity of this activities questionnaire was established in an ear-
lier study (Wilson et al., 1999). Activities included in the current question-
naire were: “active” television watching (where some form of interaction
was involved or where the program contained some educational content);
reading newspapers, books, and magazines; game playing including card
games, draughts, chess, board games, crossword puzzles, jigsaw puzzles and
solving logic problem puzzles; social activity stimulation, such as eating out
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activities; involvement in a hobby or club or any volunteer work (e.g., golf
club, train enthusiasts, painting, photography, etc.); keeping in contact with
friends and family (e.g., letter writing or e-mailing, telephoning, sending
birthday cards and buying gifts); planning, shopping for, and preparing
meals; educational activities – adult education classes of any sort where you
are learning new information or skills; and visits to art galleries, the theatre
and places of historical interest. The same five-point scale as that used by
Wilson et al. (2002) was utilized. This questionnaire provided a measure to
ensure that pre-experimental levels of cognitively stimulating activity did
not differ between the experimental versus the control group.
Design
Participants were randomly allocated into one of two groups, an exper-
imental or a control group, of equal size. Both the control and experimental
groups were tested on the battery of pre- and post-test measures with an
intervening period of approximately 10–12 weeks. The experimental group
also undertook a period of mentally stimulating activities between pre- and
post-test. The pre- and post-measures were analyzed in a 2 × 2 repeated mea-
sures analyses of variance (ANOVA), with group (experimental vs. control) as
a between subjects factor and time (pre vs. post) as a within subjects factor.
Experimental Procedure and Materials
The experimental manipulation encouraged and guided participants in
engaging in a diverse set of novel perceptual-motor and cognitive activities
that were thought to be mentally stimulating (i.e., inducing the use of prob-
lem solving and/or creative abilities). Some activities were undertaken indi-
vidually, at home, whereas others were undertaken in a group context in the
laboratory.
The explanation to the participants in the experimental group,
regarding the purpose of the research, was that we were seeking to exam-
ine how engaging in novel and challenging activities affected feelings of
well-being and how mood states influence performance on certain tests.
The control group participants were told that the purpose of the research
was to examine how performance on some tests changes on re-test and to
see how mood states may relate to this performance. Thus, expectation as
to outcome should not differ between the experimental and control
groups.
Participants were instructed to carry out the home activities at a time
of day that suited them best. Although it has been shown that the morning
is generally a better time of day for older adults (see Lustig, Hasher, &
Tonev, 2001), it was not practical to demand that participants allocate set
times of the day to the activities. However, a group testing session
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09:30 and 12:00 h. Individual testing sessions were arranged to suit the
participant.
In each experimental phase, 12 “home activity” tasks were distributed
to participants with the instruction to complete two activities a week with a
gap of 2 days between tasks. These comprised mentally stimulating home
activities including word manipulation, “making sense of figures” (a simple
mathematics activity); creative drawing activities; identification of mystery
photos and dot-to-dot puzzles; word-logic puzzles and creative modelling
activities. Each of the six different activity types had two forms (Form A and
B). For the creative activities all materials were supplied. Participants were
asked to spend between 40 min to 1 h on each home activity; however, infor-
mal feedback from participants suggested that, in general, up to 1 h was
devoted to the home activity tasks, as suggested, but that if the participant
had found the task particularly enjoyable or engrossing they had sometimes
spent considerably longer on it.
The three in-lab sessions involved the use of a tape of Tuvan throat
music, “Sound of the Steppes” (for unfamiliar music exposure and musical
critique), cardboard tubes, tape and marbles (for interactive group construc-
tion of a working marble run), newspapers, string and plastic pulleys (for
group construction of a newspaper tower), an origami book with origami
paper (Origami for Beginners), and a board game called “Ingenuity” (for
description see www.ingenuitygames.com).
Cognitive and Neuropsychological Test Administration
All tests were administered following a standardized delivery format
and were administered in the same order. A group administration (pre- and
post-test) of several tests was held for both control and experimental groups.
For the control group this was followed by a cup of tea and the opportunity
for a general chat. In addition, the experimental group also carried out the
first of the group activity sessions and was allocated home activity tasks and
any necessary task-related materials and instructions to take home with
them. The group sessions (five in total for the experimental group and two
for the control group) varied in size, depending on participant commitments
(four to eight participants per group).
Following the experimental period of mentally stimulating activities
(over 10–12 weeks) for the experimental group, or following a period of
the same length but without the activities for the control group, partici-
pants were re-tested on the same experimental measures as used in the first
test session. As at pre-test, some testing was administered in a group test
session and the rest were administered individually. The mood question-
naire was also re-presented, consistent with the participant’s expectations,
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participant’s mood between the two testing sessions. The post-test individ-
ual session took approximately 90 min per participant. Participants were
debriefed following the final group testing session and travel expenses
were reimbursed.
Compliance and Attrition
Across the two groups the completion rate, once participants had com-
mitted to the experiment, was very high with only one participant being lost
from the experimental group. This participant reported that she had underes-
timated her current level of alternative commitment and would not have time
to complete the home activity assignments. Compliance with regard to the
completion of the home activities was a little more varied; out of the
twelve home activity packs given out the average completion rate was 11.3
of the tasks. This equated to most participants completing all the activities
but one or two missing out a couple of activities that they did not find as
appealing as others; for example, there were a couple of activities that
were artistic in nature and these were the ones most often not attempted.
All participants were administered the post-test measures at the end of the
manipulation period, regardless of whether they had completed all the
tasks.
RESULTS
Analyses showed that there were no significant pre-test between-group dif-
ferences for the control versus experimental groups on age, years in formal
education, crystallized intelligence (NART), or fluid intelligence (see table 1).
Thus, participants in the two groups started out at similar (matched) levels
on these variables. The groups also were well equated on pre-experimental
levels of cognitively stimulating activity, as determined by the Life Activi-
ties Questionnaire (control group M=2.79; SD=0.41; experimental group
M=2.79; SD=0.48), F < 1 for the effect of group.
Experimental Phase 1 (P1)
The first experimental phase (P1) represented a small exploratory
study (with 10 participants per group; mean age of 68.70, SD=4.72). Results
from this study were encouraging. Comparison of the two groups, on pre- to
post-test changes on the fluid intelligence measure of the CCF, showed that
the experimental group made a gain in score of 3.10 points (from a mean of
32.40 at pre-test to a score of 35.50 at post-test). This was in comparison to
the control group, which showed a slight decline in performance of –0.60 of
a point (pre-test score of 32.70 and post-test score of 32.10). A 2 × 2
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(experimental vs. control) as a between-subjects factor, showed this difference
to be significant, F(1, 18) = 6.37, p  = .01 for the group × time interaction,1
effect size d  = 1.19. Thus the experimental group demonstrated a signifi-
cantly greater gain in fluid intelligence performance from pre- to post-test
than did the control group.
Experimental Phase 2 (P2)
The second experimental phase (P2) was a replication of the first
phase, conducted to provide a larger sample (N  = 24, mean age of 67.92
years). Results from the combined P1/P2 phases (N  = 44) continued to pro-
vide support for the hypothesis. Both the control group and the experimental
group showed a performance increase on the CCF (pre- to post-test). Consistent
1 The significance values for the tests of the primary hypotheses are given as one-tailed values. The ratio-
nale for this is two-fold: Firstly, if the group exposed to the mentally stimulating activity were to show
significantly poorer pre- to post-test levels of performance than that shown by the control group who
were not given these activities, this would not be considered to be of particular theoretical interest –
since there is no published evidence to suggest this would occur; secondly, it seems reasonable to
assume that the experimental effect size, given the relatively time-limited (10–12 week) experimental
intervention, is likely to be small, so that this procedure reduces the probability, in this exploratory
phase, of a Type II error. As noted in the Discussion, there is a clear need for a larger-scale investigation
involving a longer-term manipulation than is used here.
TABLE 1. Pre-test demographic characteristics for all experimental and control conditions
Experimental Phase n Age Yrs Ed NART CCF
Phase 1
Control group 10
M 69.70 14.10 42.80 32.70
SD 4.22 4.64 3.41 6.55
Experimental group 10
M 66.70 15.30 43.00 32.40
SD 4.72 4.74 3.09 4.43
Combined Phases 1 and 2
Control group 22
M 67.00 12.84 40.68 29.91
SD 3.81 2.84 5.58 6.27
Experimental group 22
M 68.36 12.80 38.27 29.32
SD 3.97 3.28 8.01 5.45
Note: Starting point data for participants in each group (control and experimental), including mean
(M) and standard deviation (SD), for age, years of formal education (Yrs Ed), National Adult Read-
ing test (NART), and Cattell’s Culture Fair intelligence test (CCF). Independent sample t-test com-
parisons of the control vs. experimental groups for the four pre-test measures: age, t(42)=1.61,
p=.12; years in formal education, t(42)=1.29, p=.20; crystallized intelligence (NART), t(42)=−0.05,
p=.96; fluid intelligence, t(42)=0.33, p=.74. The NART IQ estimates for the combined Phases 1 and
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with the earlier PI findings, the increase was greater for the experimental
group (mean pre-score of 29.32 to post-test score of 31.82; an increase of 2.5
points) than for the control group (mean pre-score of 29.91 to post-test score
of 30.55; an increase of 0.64 points). Figure 1 presents the combined sample
results. An ANOVA showed this difference between groups to be signifi-
cant, F(1, 42) = 3.35, p = .04, for the group time interaction, effect size d  =
.56. Thus the experimental group showed a significantly greater increase in
performance on the fluid intelligence measure, pre- to post-test, than did the
control group. The effect size estimate points to a small-to-medium experi-
mental effect.
Although it is customary to consider only the total score from the CCF,
exploratory analyses of the subtests were carried out. These analyses
revealed that the experimental group showed numerically greater pre- to
post-test gains than did the control group on each of the four CCF subtests.
Although no group ×  time interactions were observed for any of the four
subtests considered separately, focused comparisons, conducted within the
experimental group alone, showed a significant pre- to post-test gain on sub-
test two (classifications) and subtest four (conditions). It is not clear how
these subtests differ from each other in terms of cognitive processing
demands, or whether the effects observed would be replicated, but these
potential differences in subtest gains could be further investigated in future
research.
A separate analysis of the gains achieved by males and females was
carried out. Although males showed gains that were very slightly numerically
FIGURE 1. Pre- and post-test mean group scores on the Cattell’s Culture Fair intelligence test (CCF). 
Note: The maximum number correct for the CCF is 40. Standard error bars are shown, with 1 SE 
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greater (M  = 2.86, SD = 1.95) than were the gains shown by females (M  =
2.34, SD  = 3.5), this difference was not significant, F < 1.
On the second measure of interest, where a directional trend had been
observed in the Phase 1 experiment, for the P1/P2 combined sample the
experimental group showed an increase in performance on the WAIS-R
Blocks from pre- to post-test (mean pre-score of 31.00 to post-test score of
34.82; an increase of 3.82 points) whereas the control group showed a
smaller increase pre- to post-test (mean pre-score of 32.62 to post-test score
of 33.09; an increase of .47 of a point). These outcomes are shown in figure 2.
An ANOVA showed this difference between groups to be significant,
F(1, 41)=4.99, p=.02, for the group× time interaction. Thus the experimen-
tal group showed a significantly greater increase in performance on this
visual-spatial measure, pre- to post-test, than did the control group.
The measures of depression and anxiety, from the HADS, were ana-
lyzed for both groups from the pre- and post-manipulation testing points.
The levels of these were very similar for both groups and remained very sta-
ble over the experimental period.
DISCUSSION
Primary Experimental Hypothesis
The disuse hypothesis of cognitive aging suggests that declines in cog-
nitive performance by older adults, particularly on tasks that require active
online manipulation of information rather than reliance on existing knowl-
edge, arise as a result of decreased involvement in activities that call on such
“fluid intelligence” capabilities. This hypothesis was tested in a two-phase
experimental paradigm, the first of which was a pilot study and the second of
which was intended to replicate the first and increase the sample size. In
FIGURE 2. Pre- and post-test mean group scores on the WAIS-R blocks. Note: The maximum total 
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each phase, older adults were randomly assigned to either a control condi-
tion, or to an experimental condition in which they were encouraged to
engage in a wide range of stimulating novel activities, both at home and in
group-sessions in the laboratory, over a 10–12-week period. The results sup-
ported the hypothesis that increased participation in novel stimulating activities
would be associated with increased cognitive performance on a test of fluid
intelligence. The experimental group showed an increase in performance on
Cattell’s Culture Fair test of .56 of a standard deviation compared to that
shown by controls (combined across-experiment effect size d for P1 and P2:
d=.56, N=44). This benefit is of a similar magnitude to that reported previ-
ously for studies of test-specific guided training (e.g., Baltes et al., 1986)
and points to a small-to-medium experimental effect. However, unlike the
guided training studies where benefits were restricted to the same or very
similar tests, the benefits shown here were obtained through engagement in
novel activities, such as word logic puzzles, critique of unfamiliar music,
construction activities, and creative modelling, that were unrelated to the
measure used to evaluate performance. The finding that levels of anxiety and
depression were equal between the experimental and control groups and
remained stable across the experimental period suggests that the perfor-
mance improvements observed in the manipulation group cannot be attrib-
uted to any improvements in mood or reduction in anxiety levels.
These outcomes strongly suggest that increasing the opportunities of
older adults for engagement in new and challenging pursuits can lead to
much more flexible and adaptive thinking than might be expected based on
the standard view of cognitive aging. Equally important, the observation that
these gains in fluid intelligence performance were obtained using an experi-
mental design, with healthy adults randomly allocated to either the experi-
mental or control group, addresses the persistent question of the direction of
causality in research on the effects of participation in cognitively stimulating
activities on the cognitive function of older adults. The findings reported
here provide new evidence to suggest that it is not only that individuals who
lead more intellectually active lives are buffered against cognitive decline
(causal direction from pre-existing higher levels of activity to enhanced or
better preserved cognitive performance) but that engaging in more intellec-
tually active pursuits may itself enhance cognitive performance (causal
direction from engagement in cognitive activities to enhanced or better pre-
served cognitive performance).
The current research has provided evidence that is consistent with the
experimental hypothesis, suggesting that a period of increased mental stimu-
lation – using novel materials and novel cognitive processes that most likely
demand the involvement of higher brain function – results in a correspond-
ing increase in performance on measures of fluid intelligence. Evidence
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is dependent upon higher functioning, particularly frontal function, and also
the integrity of the brain as a global unit (e.g., Isingrini et al., 1997; Stuart-
Hamilton, 1996; Duncan, Emslie, & Williams, 1996).
It is possible that the experience of increased levels of engagement
with mentally stimulating activities has a similar effect on the brain to that
proposed by Jenkins et al. (2005) wherein, considering the relatively broad
transfer effects observed, they theorized that their experimental training
method “does not improve a memory system per se but may enhance pro-
cesses that are applicable across multiple systems” (p. 295). As our own
manipulation is not specific to any particular ability, but is rather very broad
in scope, we speculate that this overall improvement across multiple systems
may be an equally plausible contributor to the experimental outcomes that
we report here. The currently reported manipulation and that by Jenkins et
al. (2005) both demonstrated an improvement in areas of cognitive function
specifically known to show age-related decline and, as such, may merit con-
tinued investigation in a wider population to assess their use as potential
methods for rehabilitation training (e.g., in individuals with mild cognitive
impairment, or Alzheimer’s disease).
Although the current research findings are consistent with the disuse
hypothesis of age-related decline and also indirectly point to plasticity of
brain processes as the underlying factor, causality is not proved. Behavioural
changes inevitably depend on changes in brain function, but such changes
cannot be claimed to directly or necessarily reflect neural plasticity.
Although this is, indeed, a plausible explanation, stronger inferential
grounds for this conclusion would require neuroanatomical, or functional
neuroanatomical, evidence for corresponding and correlated changes in
brain activity – along the lines such as that shown in recent investigations of
the brain correlates, in young adults, of acquiring complex skills such as jug-
gling (Draganski et al., 2004) or training to increase working memory capac-
ity (Olesen et al., 2004). It also would need to be further bolstered by
evidence of the attenuation or reversal of the brain changes when the
increased novel stimulating activity is removed or reduced. The promising
behavioural results reported here suggest that such a large-scale endeavour is
both important, and potentially feasible.
Limitations
One threat to the validity of the reported research is the fact that the
majority of the participants who volunteer to help with scientific research are
unrepresentative of the normal population (Ganguli, Lytle, Reynolds, &
Dodge, 1998; Helliwell, Aylesworth, McDowell, Baumgarten, & Sykes,
2001; for a summary see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pp. 225–226). This is
a problem that is faced by many researchers and especially those carrying
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munity, with the researcher going to the participants rather than the reverse,
is one way to address this issue but this, of course, creates many new logisti-
cal problems. Such community-based research would allow the inclusion of,
for example, much older participants, and those who already have lower
existing levels of mental stimulation in their day-to-day existence (e.g., as a
result of restrictions on mobility). It would be of value to assess how a
change in these parameters affects the experimental outcome, thereby evalu-
ating the generalizability of the experimental effect.
Two limitations of the reported research are the relatively small sample size,
which limits statistical power, and the fact that the experimental intervention
period was of relatively short duration, especially considering that any
decline attributable to disuse may have occurred over a number of years.
Several pragmatic constraints contributed to the number of participants that
could be tested, and to the duration of the experimental intervention, particu-
larly constraints on the time and resources available for the research. Both
limitations might be addressed by performing a similar study but with an
increased sample size and lasting over an extended period (6 months would
seem a logical first extension). The pragmatic challenges that such an inves-
tigation poses are perhaps obvious, involving as it would a tremendous
amount of organisation and very many person hours. Nonetheless, whereas it
is accepted that the treatment period was short, an experimental effect was
observed and this can be viewed as particularly noteworthy when taking the
limitation of the brevity of the manipulation into account.
A further issue, deserving of mention, is the fact that the amount of
social contact between the two groups was not equal. Although both the con-
trol and experimental groups experienced opportunities for social exchange
(within the group sessions), the number of these sessions was greater for the
experimental group. Whilst it seems unlikely that the social stimulation from
the extra group sessions can provide an explanation for the differential
increase in performance on the reported measures, it can be speculated that
such social contact, in conjunction with the mentally stimulating activity,
may have had a combined beneficial effect. Unfortunately it is not within the
remit of this study to establish whether this is the case or not, though
research suggests that marked withdrawal or disengagement from social
activities is associated with increased risk of cognitive decline (Bassuk,
Glass, & Beckman, 1999). Any extension study could use a control social
contact group to assess the contributions made by the social component of
the manipulation – this would be particularly pertinent if the study were to
be of longer duration.
Two final observations might be made. First, this study does not allow
the differential benefits derived from the home, versus the in-lab, activities
to be separated. The relative contributions of these two components might be
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valuable when trying to establish best practice for any potential rehabilita-
tion programmes. Second, it is worth noting here that something of a dra-
matic change has been taking place in the population of older adults, such
that it would seem that 60 or 65 is not as “old an age” as it once was. This is
attributable, in part at least, to advances in health care so that older individuals
in today’s world are healthier. Also, given the constant exposure to techno-
logical change, they are perhaps likely to be somewhat more flexibly adaptive
than earlier generations. Thus, future research might be extended to individu-
als who are of older ages than those who participated in the current study.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated that even a relatively brief period of
increased cognitively stimulating activity had clear beneficial effects on the
cognitive test performance of healthy older adults as measured by a widely
accepted measure of fluid intelligence. These experimental outcomes add to
a large and still growing body of evidence pointing to considerable plasticity
in human intelligence functioning, including forms of thought and reasoning
deemed most susceptible to age-related decline. With increased opportuni-
ties for novel and continuing exploration, and the full (and playful) use
rather than disuse of our cognitive abilities, decrements in our capacity to
creatively and flexibly grapple with the world, in ways that do not rely on
prior learning or knowledge, may not be as severe, as sharp, or as early as –
without such stretching towards mental flexibility – they otherwise would be.
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